"We have done this because we love liberty and hate authority." – Voltairine de Cleyre
Archive for March, 2010
Libertarians for Redistribution
Mar 24th
This is a guest post by Gary Chartier. It originally appeared on his blog.
Libertarianism is a redistributive project. That’s another way in which radical market anarchism is rightly seen as part of the socialist tradition.
Statists on both the left and the right favor the redistribution of wealth. Libertarians, by contrast, are often assumed to be dead-set against all varieties of redistribution. But it’s important to see that whether this is really the case or not depends on how we answer several questions:
- Agent: who effects the redistribution?
- Rationale: what justifies the redistribution?
- Means: how is the redistribution accomplished?
Statist Redistribution
For statists, the agent of redistribution is the state. The rationales for redistribution are primarily consequentialist—it’s seen as designed to bring about some favored end-state—though it may also be used to punish the putatively undeserving and to reward the arguably virtuous. The means? The creation of monopolies, the enactment of regulations, the confiscation of property via eminent domain, or the transfer of resources acquired via taxation.
Thus, both kinds of statists shift wealth from those who produce it to politically favored elites. They may also, of course, shift resources to the economically vulnerable, but the prime beneficiaries of these programs are various groups of politically influential people.
Statist redistribution is unjust because it employs aggressive means and because it is undertaken by the state—an aggressive monopolist. It is indefensible to the extent that its viability depends on the coherence of consequentialism. And it is undesirable because it serves the interests of the power elite at the expense of the well being of ordinary people.
Solidaristic Redistribution
Many libertarians acknowledge the importance of voluntary, solidaristic redistribution, undertaken by people using their own resources for the purpose of aiding victims of accident or disaster or those experiencing economic insecurity and not coercively mandated by the state. It is, indeed, perfectly consistent with libertarian principles to maintain that, while it is not just to use force to effect solidaristic redistribution, engaging in it may nonetheless be an “imperfect” duty: something one has a responsibility to do, but which one doesn’t owe to any specific person, and which can reasonably be fulfilled in multiple ways—and which cannot therefore be claimed by anyone in particular as a right. The agent of such redistribution is the individual, using her own resources and operating independently or through a voluntary association. The rationale is the importance (however understood) of helping those who need assistance. The means—all voluntary—might include contributions to worthwhile projects, providing unemployment for those unable to secure work, various kinds of investments, and direct gifts to economically vulnerable people.
Transactional and Rectificational Redistribution
But this is hardly the only kind of redistribution libertarians can and should favor. Libertarians also have good reason to recognize the importance of two other kinds of redistribution: redistribution understood as the predictable and desirable outcome of the maintenance of a freed market, and redistribution as a matter of corrective justice.. We can call these kinds of redistribution transactional and rectificational.
Transactional Redistribution
Transactional redistribution is just a description of what happens in a genuinely freed market. Markets undermine privilege. Without the protection afforded by monopoly privileges (including patents and copyrights), subsidies, tariffs, restrictions on union organizing, protections for long-term ownership of uncultivated property, and so forth, members of the power elite, forced to participate along with everyone else in the process of voluntary cooperation that is the freed market, will tend to lose ill-gotten gains. They will retain wealth only if they actually serve the needs of other market participants. And they will be unable to use the legal system to protect their wealth from squatters (by enabling them to maintain uncultivated land indefinitely) or to limit vigorous bargaining by workers (both because workers will be freer to organize without statist restrictions and because the absence of such restrictions will give workers options other than paid employment that will improve their negotiating positions).
While unfettered competition obviously will not create mathematical equality, it will make it much harder for vast disparities of wealth to persist than at present. The state props up the power elite, using the threat of aggression to shift wealth to the politically favored. Removing the privileges of the power elite will lead, through the operation of the market, to the widespread dispersion of wealth members of the power elite are able to retain at present in virtue of the protection they receive from the political order.
The means of transactional redistribution is the market. The direct agents are ordinary market actors, while those responsible for the elimination of statist privileges that distort the market and prop up the wealth of the power elite are the indirect agents. The rationales for transactional redistribution include the value of freedom and the injustice of the privileges transactional redistribution corrects.
Rectificational Redistribution
Eliminating privilege and creating a freed market will tend to foster the widespread sharing of wealth. But it will not on its own be sufficient to make up for the effects of systematic aggression by the members of the power elite and their allies. That’s why rectificational redistribution is also important.
Massive injustice lies at the root of much of the contemporary distribution of wealth. Land theft is the most obvious example. But other kinds of aggression—the internal passport system implemented in eighteenth-century England, for instance, or the engrossment of unowned land by state fiat—have also served to deprive ordinary people of resources and opportunities. The beneficiaries of this kind of aggression have varied to some extent, but they have consistently belonged to politically favored groups—they’ve been either members of the power elite or their associates.
People deserve compensation for the losses they have suffered at the hands of those who prefer the political to the economic means of acquiring wealth. It is obviously not possible to correct all historical injustices. But when those injustices have systematically benefited some identifiable groups at the expense of others, radical correction is possible and entirely warranted. That’s why Murray Rothbard argued that slaves should be entitled to the plantation land on which they worked: their putative “owners” had not used their own labor, or the labor of free people cooperating with them, to cultivate the land; rather, those who cultivated it for the members of the plantocracy did so at gunpoint. Thus, the land was reasonably regarded as unowned prior to the cultivating work of the slaves, who should have been treated as, in effect, homesteading it—and who obviously deserved compensation for the theft of their labor by their “owners.”
In the same way, independent farmers turned into serfs by violence deserved, Rothbard believed, to receive title to the land on which they worked, while the aristocratic proprietors of the latifundia on which they worked deserved precisely nothing in compensation for land to which they weren’t entitled in the first place. Military contractors, research universities, and other entities largely supported by the state’s theft of land and resources might well, he and Karl Hess suggested, be treated as unowned and capable of being homestead by their workers or others. And it would be easy to argue along similar lines that those prevented from homesteading unowned land by means of its legal engrossment should be allowed to claim it. And so forth.
The means of rectificational redistribution is the reallocation of unjustly acquired or retained property titles. The direct agents are the people who homestead property newly acknowledged to be unowned or who claim property unjustly taken from or denied to them or their predecessors in interest, while those who work to ensure the denial of recognition or protection to unjust titles are the indirect agents. The rationales for rectificational redistribution include both the injustices of the titles to the property rectificational redistribution reallocates and the claims to compensation of those deprived of title to their own property or unjustly prevented for claiming unowned property by the power elite. While it is not a source of independent justification for reallocating title, the greater dispersion of wealth this kind of redistribution effects can be welcomed by libertarians both in virtue of the benefits it confers on economically vulnerable people and because of its contribution to greater social stability.
Libertarianism as a Redistributive Project
Libertarian redistribution is just because it employs voluntary or rectificatory means and because it is undertaken by non-state actors. It does not require any sort of global consequentialist justification. And it serves to empower ordinary people and compensate them for injustice.
Statists might reflexively dismiss libertarian redistribution because it isn’t undertaken by the state. But, if they did, they would owe us an explanation: why should they be concerned primarily about means? Statists ordinarily argue for redistribution either as a means of reducing economic vulnerability or as a way of fostering economic equality, understood as valuable in its own right. But libertarian redistribution would certainly achieve the former goal and would likely promote the latter, too. So statists opposed to libertarian redistribution would seem to have fetishized statist means—and to care more about these means than about the purported ends of statist policies.
Libertarians rightly reject statist redistribution as a variety of slavery. But they have every reason to embrace solidaristic, transactional, and rectificational redistribution. A libertarian commitment to redistribution helps clearly to identify libertarianism as a species of genuine radicalism that challenges the status quo, undermines hierarchy, exclusion, and poverty, and fosters authentic empowerment.
My Homework, Week 2.
Mar 22nd
I present my second week critique of pages 16-42 of the Tannehill’s The Market for Liberty. I feel I most apologies for this piece because it was read and written in one night that ended a full day of flying. The previous week and weekend were spent in the San Fransisco Bay Area attending their Anarchist Book Fair. Needless to say I had a blast, learned a lot and made a couple friends. The Bay Area Wobblies are friendly, open and amazing.
The question being critiqued for this week: “To what extent and in what ways, if any, does government exhibit the problems typical of other monopolies?” (I apologies for neglecting to giving the question being addressed in the first week: “What is aggression? How can we distinguish between aggression and other kinds of undesirable influence?”)
“In their book The Market for Liberty the Tannehills, Morris and Linda, present a theoretical case for distinguishing between two types of monopoly: one benign and one malign.
The benign or market monopoly maintains its vaulted status tentatively and precariously, always contingent on customer satisfaction or competitor disinterest. If the market monopoly were to offend its customer base or draw unwanted entrepreneurial attention, it’s over.
The malign or coercive monopoly is the complete opposite. It “maintains itself by the initiation of force or the threat of force to prohibit competition, and sometimes to compel customer loyalty.” (Pg. 27)
Roderick T. Long, in his Libertarian Anarchism: Responses to Ten Objections, identifies three basic problems that the statist or pro-coercive-monopolist must overcome for their case to have merit: the moral, incentive and epistemic problems.
The moral problem asks the question, “why you; what makes you so special?” Granting someone monopoly use of coercive powers seems rather drastic and dangerous.
“To put it simply, government is the rule of some men over others by initiated force, which is slavery, which is wrong.” (Pg. 35)
The incentive problem asks the question, “in the absence of market forces directing agents towards the production of lowers costs, higher qualities or both, what incentives at work on the coercive monopolist guiding them to similar ends?” If there is no worry of losing market share or market relevancy, then why not set my commodity price, by lowering quality or raising costs, to that point just below where you would prefer to go without?
The epistemic problem asks the question, “even if you found a saint (that had no objection to ruling over other humans?), gave them coercive monopoly powers and they did everything they could to stay along the straight and narrow road of truth and justice, how do they know that they offering the best quality goods and the cheapest price?” Without competition or options, choices or alternatives to compare notes with or contrast services against, how do I know that I am providing a desirable and efficient service? Compared to what?
The Tannehills begin their analysis of the State by defining it as a coercive monopoly in classic Weberian fashion:
“Government is a coercive monopoly which has assumed power over and certain responsibilities for every human being within the geographical area which it claims as its own.” (Pg. 32.)
They rightly do not put anything past or any sphere of social interaction beyond the reach of the State; not narrowing it down to night watchmen duties of retaliatory force via police, armies and judges.
The State for the most part interferes with the market through indirect means or the threat of force. The imposition of taxes, regulations, licensing, and credit manipulation skews, suppresses and restricts market actors and participation. The most unfortunate result of this kind of market destruction is the creation of a permanent underclass of poverty level labors. The diminished access to capital and means of capitalization provide ostensible verification for statist apologists to demand more police with greater powers to keep disenfranchised populations under control.
The consequences of one problem becomes the reason for another.”
My Homework, Week 1.
Mar 21st
I enrolled and was one of the lucky 15 to test out C4SS’s new ATP101 – An Introduction to Anarchism. The instructor is the always surprising and refreshing Gary Chartier; who has also provided the internet with his lecture series covering ATP-101. Below is my first weeks assignment, a 500 to 600 word critique of the first 15 pages of the primary text: The Market for Liberty by Linda and Morris Tannehill. As will be apparent I have some problems with their, the Tannehills, normative foundations for anarchism as well as their rhetorical strategy, defenses of retribution and Big Business. I look at the whole experience as fruitful, fun and thoughtful. I hope to be publishing my other homework assignments as the weeks roll on. ALL the Best, –James.
“My reading of the assigned pages, 1-15, of The Market for Liberty has stirred up a number of positive and negative emotional responses. The Tannehills, Linda and Morris, seems to be trying to “scorch the earth” of any rival theories that might be in the minds of the audience. They repeat certain phrases over and over again as if, at first, to head off possible questions the reader might have, but, later on, it feels like it is in order to help the reader correct a bad mental habit.
This rhetorical strategy has positive and negative effects: On the positive, for a reader treading water, barely keeping their head above a tumultuous sea of forced and contradictory bromides, a clear and open desert can be a life changing discovery.
“Finally I can breathe and think,” the reader sighs.
On the negative, this desert should just be a rest stop; one cannot stay there. Life, philosophy and morality are in a continuous flux of changing conditions and shifting contexts. If you try to take the desert with you, you’ll do just that, extending it to cover the forests and lakes of your intellectual landscape.
“The only way a man can be compelled against his will to act contrary to his judgment is by the use or threat of physical force by other men. Many pressures may be brought to bear on a man, but unless he is compelled by physical force (or the threat of force, or a substitute for force) to act against his will, he still has the freedom to make his own choices. Therefore, the one basic rule of civilized society is that no man or group of men is morally entitled to initiate (to start) the use of physical force, the threat of force, or any substitute for force (such as taking something from another person by stealth) against any other man or group of men.” Pg 10.
The Tannehills have created a desert call “non-aggression.” It is a place where everything is permitted, but aggression and aggression is initiated physical force. The statement, “initiated physical force is illegitimate,” is easily acceptable, but the stressed, “only initiated physical force is illegitimate,” sounds insane. The evaluative concept “legitimate” is an index that we use to navigate our moral lives; it points us down paths worthy of exploration and identifies obstacles that are worthy of dismantling. To reduce the concept of “aggression” to only identifying “initiated physical violence” as illegitimate is putting ethical blinders on, always looking at the world from one point of view, and strapping yourself into a practical straight jacket, only reacting to physical violence while dismissing all the other ways humans are warped and adjusted by institutions.
The Tannehills mention the concept “institution” many times in the first fifteen pages.
“But more than enough can be reasoned out to prove that a truly free society – one in which the initiation of force would be dealt with justly instead of institutionalized in the form of a government – is feasible.” Pg 4.
“In all of recorded history, men have never managed to establish a social order which didn’t institutionalize violations of freedom, peace, and justice – that is, a social order in which man could realize his full potential.” Pg 6.
The sociologist Alvin Gouldner defines “institution” in his text book Modern Sociology (1963, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World Inc.) as a “societally prescribed system of (more or less) differentiated behavior by means of which recurrent problems are resolved.”
Does “aggression” and “institutionalized aggression” always look, feel or operate the same way? If not, then it might be easy to spot one while the other goes unnoticed all around you, even while you are looking for it. You might even be an active party in its maintenance.”
How does it feel to be a Fugitive?
Mar 11th
A couple of days ago it was brought to my attention that in my home state of Oklahoma I was a walking fugitive. (Hat tip to Brad Spangler) You see in Oklahoma, according to Title 21, Chapter 9, Section 374, it is a felony to “carry … or publicly display any red flag or other emblem or banner, indicating disloyalty to the Government of the United States or a belief in anarchy or other political doctrines or beliefs, whose objects are either the disruption or destruction of organized government.” I have been, peacefully mind you, walking around Tulsa, Oklahoma with ALLiance of the Libertarian Left and Industrial Workers of the World buttons pinned to my jacket (suspecting, but) never knowing that I could be punished with 10 years in prison and/or $1,000.00 fine.
I took a couple of days to reflect on this realization (no crying this time Less Antman
). I came home one day to see a cop car park along the street in front of my section of apartments and I did get a little rush of adrenaline. I tried to imagine if this is what other fugitives felt. I imagined some character from a Tarantino film sitting alone in their apartment peeking into a suitcase full of loot, jumping at every knock at the door and suspecting every motive from friends or family.
They are going to want their stuff back, so the cops are looking for me. That’s what they do; they track down stolen goods or murderers who have stolen lives. Living on borrowed time.
Wait a second! How are displays of sympathy for anarchism in any way similar to stolen money or stolen lives? What have I stolen?
Oh yeah! That’s right. I almost forgot. I stole my mind away from the government. Their truncheon or badge or letterheads are not substitutes for reasons or arguments in my presence.
So, dear friends, if you don’t hear from me in a week or two, then it might be because the government has sent the police to take their “property” back.

